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NSA AND DEA INTELLIGENCE SHARING:
WHY IT IS LEGAL AND WHY REUTERS
AND THE GOOD WIFE GOT IT WRONG
Melanie Reid*
I. INTRODUCTION
EVERYONE knew about the existence and mission of the NationalSecurity Agency (NSA) prior to June 2013. The NSA was knownfor breaking codes and monitoring conversations in the interest of
national security. However, the specifics of who was monitored and how
it was accomplished remained a mystery. That is, until Edward Snowden
began a blitzkrieg of disclosures as to the NSA’s various methods of col-
lection and programs analyzing both metadata1 and content in telephone
conversations and emails.
The Snowden disclosures about NSA programs led to additional media
reports that the NSA is sharing intelligence information with other agen-
cies. Specifically, Reuters in August of 2013 reported “[a] secretive U.S.
Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA] unit is funneling information
from intelligence intercepts, wiretaps, informants, and a massive database
of telephone records to authorities across the nation to help them launch
criminal investigations of Americans.”2 The article stated that Drug En-
forcement Administration (DEA) agents utilize “parallel construction”
to hide the original source that initiated the criminal investigation. Ac-
cording to the article, “[f]ederal agents are trained to ‘recreate’ the inves-
tigative trail to effectively cover up where the information originated.”3
Americans imagined the worst—not only was the government illegally
monitoring their phone conversations, but it was then using this informa-
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1. Metadata can “encompass everything from the nearest cell tower to the caller at
the time the call was placed, to the routing information the call took to reach its recipient,
and sometimes even the GPS location of a cell phone when it places a call.” Brian Pascal,
How Technology Broke Privacy, 40 NO. 3 LITIG. 20, at 25 (Spring 2014).
2. John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, Exclusive: U.S. directs agents to cover up pro-
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tion to initiate criminal investigations and then cover up where and how
the initial information originated. It is easy to imagine the worst when the
government remains silent, and we are left to guess whether the “cover-
up” is to protect classified sources and methods or to hide any illegalities.
This latest news story developed into a popular TV plot line. In one of
the many lawyer TV shows, “The Good Wife,” the NSA intercepts the
phone calls of lead character, Alicia Florrick, after Florrick represents a
client, Danny Marwat, an Arab-American translator who worked for the
military as a contractor until he was accused of collaborating with the
Taliban.4 The show explains that the NSA obtained a “two-hop” Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court warrant on Marwat, which al-
lowed them to listen to Marwat, his lawyers, and his lawyers’ contacts for
the past two years.5 Florrick’s son later receives multiple calls from his
ex-girlfriend who is distraught over their break up and whose father hap-
pens to be a politically connected Somali national and potential Hamas
sympathizer.6 This information gives the NSA the needed connection to
allow for a “three-hop” warrant that supposedly will allow the NSA the
ability to listen to Marwat, his lawyers, those in contact with his lawyers,
and anyone they contact.7
A few episodes later, Florrick meets with her drug dealer client,
Lemond Bishop, who asks her to be on-call on February 26th, as he may
be involved in “trouble” (a drug transaction) that day.8 On February
26th, the DEA arrests Bishop.9 The court conducts a probable cause
hearing, and the government presents a witness who testifies that she saw
Bishop and others moving duffel bags filled with white packets (presuma-
bly drugs) on the 26th.10 The episode, interestingly enough, is titled “Par-
allel Construction, Bitches,” referring to the fact that the government had
pulled the wool over the defense’s eyes by creating a phony witness to
cover up the NSA’s involvement in the investigation without the knowl-
edge of the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel.11
With any television show, it is easy to blend fact with fiction, and bor-
ing reality be damned. What is fact and what is fiction? Is this new revela-
tion, the “Snowden phenomenon,” another sign of government
misconduct and abuse of power? Or is this massive collection of platform
and intelligence sharing acceptable and necessary in a technologically
savvy age where law enforcement is continually playing catch-up and in-
telligence sharing merely levels the playing field?
4. The Good Wife: The Bit Bucket (CBS television broadcast Oct. 6, 2013); The Good
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Our liberty and privacy interests must be balanced with the govern-
ment’s responsibility to protect American citizens against foreign threats
and its responsibility to investigate and enforce the laws of the United
States. There is no easy solution; that is why Congress, the Supreme
Court, lower courts, and FISA courts constantly reevaluate this balancing
act. There is clearly a need to create a system of checks and balances to
ensure our government is not abusing its power. However, it is also im-
perative to remember these checks and balances are not meant to satisfy
our own personal curiosity and instinctive need-to-know.
This article explores the constitutionality of “parallel construction,” the
relationship between the intelligence community and law enforcement,
and whether the non-disclosure of how a criminal investigation was initi-
ated constitutes a violation of a defendant’s right to discovery pre-trial
and right to a fair trial. The article first examines each investigative tool
mentioned in the Reuters article12 used to initiate investigations and ana-
lyzes the legality of doing so. Part II of this article focuses on the legality
of collecting, accessing, and analyzing information gathered by the intelli-
gence community (IC), specifically the NSA, and the subsequent disclo-
sure of intelligence to other law enforcement entities for use in criminal
investigations. Part III discusses the recent revelations that the DEA has
been hiding its sources and methods used to initiate a criminal investiga-
tion and has been able to protect them from disclosure in many instances.
Part IV assesses the impact of this disclosure by determining how tools
typically used to initiate investigations (anonymous tips, cooperating wit-
nesses, informants, etc.) are treated by the courts and whether they are
discoverable compared to the tools recently revealed to be used by the
DEA (to include domestic and foreign wiretaps, NSA intercepts, and
phone log databases). Part V specifically examines the legality of the
DEA’s use of NSA intercepts to initiate investigations and whether this
practice should be abandoned. Currently, the Classified Information Pro-
cedures Act (CIPA) is in place to prevent the discovery of classified ma-
terial and protect the government’s sources and methods by setting forth
procedures to be used in any criminal case where classified information is
at issue.13 These procedures are said to protect against the disclosure of
classified information while at the same time ensuring the defendant a
right to a fair trial by having the judge in the case review the evidence ex
parte and determine whether it should be disclosed to the defendant in
redacted form (thereby fulfilling the prosecutor’s discovery obligations).
This article explores whether CIPA is effective and up to the task of en-
suring that the defendant’s concerns are taken care of while placing suffi-
cient checks and balances on the government to ensure the DEA does
not take advantage of its privilege of keeping IC information secret. I
argue that the existing procedures put in place, CIPA and Federal Rule of
12. Shiffman & Cooke, supra note 2. The Reuters article’s authors utilize internal
DEA documents and PowerPoint presentations to support their conclusions.
13. 18 U.S.C. App. 3 §§ 1–16 (2012).
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Criminal Procedure 16,14 adequately protect the defendant’s right to dis-
covery and right to a fair trial. While public concerns as to the DEA’s use
of NSA material, which bring to the forefront the broad consequences of
intelligence sharing, appear to be well-founded, the question that must be
asked is whether law enforcement should be allowed to tackle proactive
cases in which it attempts to prevent the crime from occurring in the first
place. If so, then law enforcement needs sufficient investigatory tools and
the ability to take advantage of intelligence sharing opportunities. If not,
then law enforcement outside the counterterrorism context should not be
included as a recipient of NSA intelligence information and intelligence
sharing, and existing federal regulations that currently allow this practice
should be narrower in scope.
II. THE LEGALITY OF THE DISCLOSED NSA PROGRAMS
AND THE FISA PROCESS
The first questionable method mentioned in Reuters that is used to
initiate DEA criminal investigations is information gathered from the IC,
specifically through NSA “intercepts.”15 Therefore, it is important to
evaluate the known NSA programs capable of producing valuable intelli-
gence that can be passed to law enforcement and whether this tool is, in
fact, legal.
A. THE BIRTH OF THE NSA
The NSA, one of many agencies within the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity, is largely a signals intelligence (SIGINT)16 agency that falls under
the direction of the Department of Defense (DOD).17 Established in
1952 by President Harry Truman,18 the NSA is housed at Fort Meade,
Maryland,19 has more than 35,000 employees,20 and is accountable for
$10.8 billion, or approximately twenty percent, of the annual intelligence
14. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
15. Shiffman & Cooke, supra note 2. It is unclear whether the article is referring to
metadata or the monitoring of actual conversations.
16. “SIGINT is intelligence derived from electronic signals and systems used by for-
eign targets, such as communications systems, radars, and weapons systems. SIGINT pro-
vides a vital window for our nation into foreign adversaries’ capabilities, actions, and
intentions.” NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, http://www.nsa.gov/sigint/index.shtml (last vis-
ited Aug. 11, 2014).
17. Frequently Asked Questions, Oversight, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, http://www
.nsa.gov/about/faqs/oversight.shtml (last visited Aug. 11, 2014).
18. Frequently Asked Questions, About NSA, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, http://
www.nsa.gov/about/faqs/about_nsa.shtml (last visited Aug. 11, 2014).
19. National Security Agency (NSA) Headquarters, THE CENTER FOR LAND USE IN-
TERPRETATION, http://clui.org/ludb/site/national-security-agency-nsa-headquarters (last vis-
ited Aug. 11, 2014).
20. Masuma Ahuja, FAQ: What you need to know about NSA surveillance and Edward
Snowden, WASHINGTON POST, July 24, 2013, http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/
faq-what-you-need-to-know-about-nsa-surveillance-and-edward-snowden/333/.
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budget.21
Its origins can be traced back to 1917 during World War I when Her-
bert O. Yardley “established America’s first permanent agency to inter-
cept foreign messages and break codes”22 named the Cipher Bureau.23 In
order to begin gathering information, the unit persuaded the Western
Union Telegraph Company to allow military intelligence to copy
messages passing through the company’s wires.24 Ironically, the unit’s op-
eration was shut down in 1929 by then-Secretary of State Henry Stimson
who famously stated, “[G]entlemen do not read each other’s mail.”25
In May 1949, all cryptologic activities were centralized under a national
organization called the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA).26 Unfor-
tunately, the AFSA was unable to centralize communications intelligence
and “largely ignored the interested civilian agencies—the Department of
State, the [Central Intelligence Agency] CIA, and the [Federal Bureau of
Investigation] FBI.”27 Thus, inter-agency coordination has been lacking
since before NSA’s inception.
In December 1951, President Harry Truman created the Brownell
Committee, a panel to investigate how AFSA had failed to achieve its
goals.28 As a result of this investigation, the AFSA was re-designated and
renamed the National Security Agency.29
“The NSA is responsible for the collection and analysis of foreign elec-
tronic intelligence and for ensuring the security of classified U.S. com-
puter systems.”30 Its mission, as set forth in Executive Order 12333,31 is to
21. The Black Budget, WASHINGTON POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
special/national/black-budget/ (last visited June 2, 2015). The total budget for the National
Intelligence Program is $52.6 billion. Id.
22. DAVID KAHN, THE READER OF GENTLEMEN’S MAIL: HERBERT O. YARDLEY AND
THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN CODEBREAKING ix (2004).
23. Cryptologic Heritage, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, http://www.nsa.gov/about/
cryptologic_heritage/center_crypt_history/pearl_harbor_review/black_chamber.shtml (last
visited Aug. 11, 2014).
24. KAHN, supra note 22, at 58.
25. Id. at ix.
26. Cryptologic History Calendar, NATIONAL CRYPTOLOGIC MUSEUM FOUNDATION,
https://cryptologicfoundationorg.presencehost.net/support/event_calendar.html/event/
2018/05/20/1526792400/afsa-created-in-1949 (last visited Aug. 12, 2014).
27. THOMAS L. BURNS, THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 1940-
1952 (U) 59 (1990), available at http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/cryptologic_histories/
origins_of_nsa.pdf. Unfortunately, this was just one of many failed attempts to coordinate
efforts and share information with other intelligence agencies.
28. NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, Cryptologic Almanac 50th Anniversary Series, The
Creation of NSA – Part 2 of 3: The Brownell Committee, available at http://www.nsa.gov/
public_info/_files/crypto_almanac_50th/The_Creation_of_NSA_Part_3.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Ahuja, supra note 20.
31. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 1981, available at http://www.archives.gov/fed-
eral-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html. Department of Defense Personnel
Security Program Regulation, 3 C.F.R. 1981, 32 C.F.R. § 154 (2012). “The collection of
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence within the United States shall be coordinated
with the FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and the Attorney General.” Id. at 1.8. “Agencies with the Intelligence Community
are authorized to collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning United States per-
432 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68
collect information that constitutes “foreign intelligence or counterintel-
ligence” while not “acquiring information concerning the domestic activi-
ties of United States persons.” NSA has declared that it relies on the FBI
to collect information on foreign intelligence activities within the borders
of the United States, while confining its own activities within the United
States to the embassies and missions of foreign nations.32
Unfortunately, NSA’s capabilities were abused during a covert action
program that lasted from 1956 to 1971 when the agency collected intelli-
gence and surveilled various United States citizens, including suspected
communists in the 1950s and civil rights activists, such as Dr. Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr., and Vietnam War protesters, such as Jane Fonda, Joan
Baez, and Dr. Benjamin Spock, in the 1960s.33 Additionally, it was re-
vealed that thousands of American citizens were subjects of illegal intelli-
gence operations.34 In response, a Congressional committee was created
in 1975.35 Headed by Senator Frank Church of Idaho, the committee
found that Congress had failed to provide the necessary statutory guide-
lines to ensure that intelligence agencies carried out their necessary mis-
sions in accordance with constitutional processes.36 The NSA would no
longer be permitted to conduct domestic eavesdropping for security and
political purposes.
Based upon the Church Committee’s findings, Congress passed the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA),37 which was meant
to limit the practice of mass surveillance in the United States.38 FISA
represented a compromise between the President and Congress.39 FISA
would be used to oversee the executive branch’s foreign intelligence ac-
tivities.40 FISA established the Foreign Intelligence Court (FISC or FISA
Court) to review FISA warrant applications that were meant to target
specific and identified agents of foreign powers.41 The FISC currently
consists of eleven federal district judges appointed for seven-year terms
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and three judges are required
sons only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned
and approved by the Attorney General.” Id. at 2.3.
32. INT’L BUS. PUBL’NS, UNITED STATES MILITARY INTELLIGENCE HANDBOOK 85
(vol. 1, 2011).
33. NAT’L COMM’N TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9/11 COMMIS-
SION REPORT 75 (July 22, 2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://
www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf; JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DE-
FENSE 77 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014).
34. Senate History: January 27, 1975 Church Committee Created, UNITED STATES SEN-
ATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Church_Committee_Created
.htm (last visited June 2, 2015).
35. Id.
36. Id. “It is this indifference to constitutional restraints that is perhaps the most
threatening of all the evidence that emerges from the findings of the Church Committee.”
Id. (quoting historian Henry Steele Commager).
37. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub.L. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1793 [herein-
after FISA of 1978] (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 to 1811 (2014)).
38. BAKER, supra note 33 at 78–79.
39. Id. at 79.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 79–80.
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to reside within twenty miles of Washington D.C.42
The FISA warrant application must consist of sufficient probable cause
to believe that “the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power
or agent of a foreign power,” and the information sought must be related
to national security.43 Originally, the agent had to certify that the infor-
mation to be sought was foreign intelligence information, and the pur-
pose of the surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information.44
A FISA warrant, unlike a Title III45 wiretap application, does not require
probable cause to believe that the target has or will commit a crime, but
the warrant affidavit needs some predicate conduct to demonstrate the
target is an agent of a foreign power.46
The FISA standard is different for foreign and U.S. persons.47 Foreign
persons can be targeted even without a court order if there is “no sub-
stantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any
communication to which a United States person is a party.”48 If there is
no court order because the target is foreign, a call in which U.S. persons
are inadvertently intercepted must be minimized.49 Most of the surveil-
lance done by the NSA falls under the category of foreign-to-foreign and
therefore is not technically covered by FISA since the surveillance is di-
rected overseas and usually against foreign persons.50
The FISA procedure also provides for cases of exigent circumstances
during which the Attorney General could authorize electronic surveil-
lance in advance of FISC approval.51 However, the court must be noti-
fied, and an application must be made no later than seventy-two hours
42. Id.; see also FISA of 1978, amended from seven to eleven judges with the USA
PATRIOT Act in 2001. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001,
sec. 208(1), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 [hereinafter PATRIOT Act] (codified in scat-
tered titles of U.S.C.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/pdf/
PLAW-107publ56.pdf.
43. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4)(A) (2014).
44. FISA of 1978, supra note 37.
45. Title III, or T3, is a federal wiretap and is a short-hand reference to the section of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.), which authorized federal law
enforcement agencies to conduct electronic surveillance. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518 (2000 & Supp.
2014) sets forth the procedural requirements for interception.
46. BAKER, supra note 33, at 80.
47. Id. “ ‘United States person’ means a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of Title 8), an unincor-
porated association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United
States or aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incor-
porated in the United States . . . .”  50 U.S.C.A. § 1801(i) (2014).
48. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1802(B) (2014).
49. BAKER, supra note 33, at 81.
50. SHANE HARRIS, THE WATCHERS: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S SURVEILLANCE STATE
163 (Penguin Books, 2011); NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, UNITED STATES SIGNALS IN-
TELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE [hereinafter USSID 18] (Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://www.dni
.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf; Exec. Order No.
12,333, supra note 31.
51. BAKER, supra note 33, at 82.
434 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68
after the Attorney General authorizes the interception.52 To maintain
congressional oversight, annual reports from the Attorney General are
also mandated, which must include the number of orders obtained during
the previous year.53
Although FISA warrants have not been made public, enough informa-
tion has come out which would indicate FISA applications and affidavits
are relatively complex and lengthy.
James E. Baker writes In the Common Defense that
[f]ollowing passage of the [FISA] Act a specialized and compart-
mented bureaucracy emerged at Department of Justice, the FBI, and
the CIA to handle the processing of FISA requests. By requiring
submission of applications by the attorney general, along with certifi-
cation from designated senior officials “that the purpose of surveil-
lance is to obtain foreign intelligence,” the Act generates a process
of layered executive review. That is because the attorney general
does not generate his or her own paperwork, and senior attorneys
within a bureaucracy are less likely to send documents to the attor-
ney general, along with other certifying officials, without careful re-
view. Indeed, some argue, the process is too layered and therefore
cumbersome, resulting in delays while paperwork transits up the bu-
reaucracy to the attorney general even in cases of emergency
authorization.54
In 1979, the FISC approved 199 warrants, a total of 635 in the 1980s,
and 886 in the 1990s; in 2000 there were 1,005 approved applications and
the number of applications doubled from 2000 to 2005.55 In 2001, there
were 932 approved applications,56 and in comparison, the FISC approved
2,072 applications in 2005.57 In FISA’s most recent report to Congress, it
is shown that 1,588 applications were approved in 2013.58 Some have ar-
gued that FISA warrants are easier to obtain than Title III warrants.
However, the percentage of FISA warrant applications that are approved
is consistent with the number of applications and authorizations for Title
III warrants.59
Between 1978 and 2001, there were no significant changes made to the
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. BAKER, supra note 33, at 83–84.
55. Id. at 83.
56. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISA 2001 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, available at
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2001rept.html.
57. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISA 2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, available at
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2005rept.html.
58. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISA 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, available at
http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2013rept.pdf.
59. BAKER, supra note 33, at 83. “In 2005, for example, there were 1,774 [Title III]
applications and 1,773 applications authorized. In 2004, there were 1,710 applications and
1,710 authorizations.” Id.; see also UNITED STATES COURTS, WIRETAP REPORTS ARCHIVE,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/WiretapReports/WiretapReports_Archive
.aspx.
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FISA process.60 FISA as it stood was considered a check on blanket pres-
idential authority to intercept conversations outside the standard warrant
process. Then suddenly post-9/11, the old ways of conducting business
within the IC no longer worked. The gloves came off as American citizens
wanted answers, and the executive branch and 9/11 Commission asked
the IC to share its information and collaborate with various federal and
state agencies, predict terrorist activity before attacks occur, and quite
simply, perform better.
B. THE “WALL” BETWEEN THE IC AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
Pre-9/11, a wall had been created between law enforcement and the
intelligence community. The concern was that law enforcement might use
FISA information to negate the necessity of a lawful Title III order and
intentionally evade the requirement of developing probable cause to de-
termine whether a target has been or is committing a crime.61 In July
1995, procedures had been put in place to regulate “the manner in which
[FISA] information could be shared from the intelligence side of the
house to the criminal side” as it related to agents and criminal prosecu-
tors.62 DOJ did not want FISA information used “to circumvent tradi-
tional criminal warrant requirements.”63 However, the procedures were
misinterpreted in a way that even an FBI agent on the intelligence side
and an agent working on a criminal investigation on the same subject
could not share information.64 Since the FISA statute indicated its sole
purpose for surveillance was intelligence, the wall could only be crossed
with the Attorney General’s approval and the FISC’s blessing.65 With this
system in place, there was no need to worry that the intelligence informa-
tion would be used against a defendant in a criminal trial.
Post-9/11, the wall disintegrated. The 9/11 Commission criticized the
barriers that had been placed between FBI intelligence sections and crim-
inal/law enforcement sections, as well as the barriers placed between in-
telligence agencies and faulted these barriers for being a large part of the
reason why the IC and law enforcement did not catch the terrorists prior
to the hijacking of the four planes on 9/11.66 The 9/11 Commission recom-
mended a unification of “the many participants in the counterterrorism
effort and their knowledge in a network-based information-sharing sys-
60. BAKER, supra note 33, at 84. However, in the early 1990s, the President sought an
amendment to FISA “to grant the FISC jurisdiction and authority to issue warrants for
physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes.” Id.
61. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 33, at 79.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 78.
64. Id. at 79.
65. BAKER, supra note 33, at 85.
66. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 33, at 345. The Commission stated: “A
‘smart’ government would integrate all sources of information to see the enemy as a whole.
Integrated all-source analysis should also inform and shape strategies to collect more intel-
ligence.” Id. at 401.
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tem that transcends traditional governmental boundaries.”67
Post-9/11, the FISA process was also criticized as too slow and cumber-
some. As described in one DOJ memo in 2006, “[t]he FISA process, by
design, moves more slowly. It requires numerous lawyers, the preparation
of legal briefs, approval from a Cabinet-level officer, certification from
the National Security Advisor or another Senate-confirmed officer, and
finally, the approval of an Article III judge.”68
However, NSA officials testified during a March 2005 report to Presi-
dent Bush that the FISA process had “not posed a serious obstacle to
effective intelligence gathering.”69
In response to the 9/11 Commission’s criticisms, as well as other criti-
cisms of the government’s ability to predict terrorist attacks and protect
the nation from other similar attacks, Congress passed the PATRIOT Act
on October 25, 2001.70 The PATRIOT Act under section 203, entitled
“Authority to Share Criminal Investigative Information,” broke down the
wall that had been blocking the flow of information between the intelli-
gence community and law enforcement, specifically as it pertained to the
FBI.71 The National Counterterrorism Center was also created, which led
to various agencies sharing and analyzing data under one roof.72
C. USA PATRIOT ACT SECTION 215: THE COLLECTION
OF “METADATA”
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, entitled “Access to Certain Business
Records for Foreign Intelligence and International Terrorism Investiga-
tions,”73 made it easier for the government to collect telephony
67. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 33, at 400.
68. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NSA PROGRAM TO DETECT AND PREVENT TERROR-
IST ATTACKS MYTH V. REALITY 3 (Jan. 27, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
documents/nsa_myth_v_reality.pdf.
69. MATTHEW M. AID, THE SECRET SENTRY: THE UNTOLD HISTORY OF THE NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 297 (Bloomsbury Press 2009) (during a hearing on the U.S.
intelligence community’s performance against the Iraqi WMD programs).
70. PATRIOT Act, supra note 42, at sec. 203.
71. Amending FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 and 18 U.S.C.A. § 2517 (2000 & Supp. 2014), Sec-
tion 203(a) discussed the authority to share grand jury information, section (b) discussed
the authority to share electronic, wire, and oral interception information, and section (c)
discussed the authority to share foreign intelligence information. PATRIOT Act, supra
note 42, at sec. 203.
72. See Exec. Order No. 13,354, 3 C.F.R. 13,354 (2004), available at http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2005-title3-vol1/pdf/CFR-2005-title3-vol1-eo13354.pdf; see also Intelli-
gence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codi-
fied at 50 U.S.C.A. § 402 (2003 & Supp. 2014)), available at http://www.nctc.gov/docs/irtpa
.pdf.
73. Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act amended the “business records” provision of
Title V, Section 501 of FISA. PATRIOT Act, supra note 47, at sec. 215. Section 215 was
reauthorized in the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-109hrpt333/
pdf/CRPT-109hrpt333.pdf; see also 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (2014).
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metadata74 and conduct records searches.75 Metadata includes “much of
the information that appears on a customer’s telephone bill: the date and
time of a call, its duration, and the participating phone numbers” and can
include the nature of “how the call was routed from one participant to the
other through the infrastructure of the telephone companies’ net-
works.”76 Electronic communications metadata includes “the ‘to,’ ‘from,’
and ‘cc’ lines of an email and the email’s time and date.”77
Section 215 allows the government to obtain a secret court order re-
quiring third parties, such as telephone companies, to hand over any
records or other “tangible thing” if deemed “relevant” to an investigation
“to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person
or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities.”78
To collect these records, the government must obtain a Section 215 or-
der from the FISC.79 Under Section 215, the government can apply to the
FISC to compel businesses other than companies to hand over user
records as long as the records are “relevant” to a terrorist investigation.80
Section 215 data related to U.S. persons can only be passed on to the
FBI or others in the IC, and the leads from the metadata are limited only
74. “Telephony metadata includes comprehensive communications routing informa-
tion, including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g., originating and ter-
minating telephone number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number,
International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, etc.), trunk identifier,
telephone calling card numbers, and time and duration of call. Telephony metadata does
not include the substantive content of any communication, as defined by 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(8), or the name, address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.”
Doug Aamoth, Verizon, Telephony Metadata, the National Security Agency, and You,
TIME, June 6, 2013, http://techland.time.com/2013/06/06/verizon-telephony-metadata-the-
national-security-agency-and-you/.
75. Section 216 governs access to online activity, such as email contact information or
Internet browsing histories. PATRIOT Act, supra note 42, at sec. 216.
76. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE
RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND
ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 8 (Jan. 23,
2014), available at https://www.eff.org/files/2014/01/23/final_report_1-23-14.pdf.
77. Press Release, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, NEWLY DECLASSI-
FIED DOCUMENTS REGARDING THE NOW-DISCONTINUED NSA BULK ELECTRONIC COM-
MUNICATIONS METADATA PURSUANT TO SECTION 402 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT (Aug. 11, 2014), available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/
press-releases/198-press-releases-2014/1099-newly-declassified-documents-regarding-the-
now-discontinued-nsa-bulk-electronic-communications-metadata-pursuant-to-section-401-
of-the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act. A now discontinued NSA program to collect
bulk electronic communications metadata was authorized pursuant to Section 402 of the
FISA (“PRTT provision”). “This collection was done only after the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court approved the government’s applications, and pursuant to court order
generally lasting 90 days. NSA was not permitted to collect the content of any electronic
communications.” Id.
78. PATRIOT Act, supra note 42, at sec. 215; see also BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE,
ARE THEY ALLOWED TO DO THAT? A BREAKDOWN OF SELECTED GOVERNMENT SUR-
VEILLANCE PROGRAMS 1 http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Govern-
ment%20Surveillance%20Factsheet.pdf.
79. In 2009, there were 21 Section 215 applications before the FISC; in 2012, there
were 212 applications. BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, supra 78, at 2.
80. Id. at 3.
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to counterterrorism investigations.81
Section 215 also established congressional oversight for the FISA pro-
gram, requiring the DOJ to conduct an audit of the program and the “ef-
fectiveness” of Section 215 and to submit an unclassified report on the
audit to the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary and
Intelligence.82
Section 215 has gone under extensive review by the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board,83 an independent agency within the executive
branch, and the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communi-
cations Technologies.84 Various bills are currently before the House and
Senate revising or eliminating the program.85
Since the telephony metadata collection program is only used for
counterterrorism investigations as it pertains to U.S. persons, this data
would not be passed to the DEA or other agencies investigating non-
terrorism cases.
D. USA PATRIOT ACT SECTION 218:
EXPANDING FISA AUTHORITY
Section 218 expanded the application of FISA to situations where for-
eign intelligence gathering was merely “a significant” purpose of the in-
vestigation rather than, as prior 1978 FISA law provided, “the sole or
primary purpose.”86 Section 218 effectively destroys the wall and allows
for the exchange of advice among the IC and law enforcement on FISA
search and surveillances. Critics argue that adding the term “significant”
will lead to overuse of the FISA process as a FISA warrant may be re-
quested for non-foreign intelligence purposes.87 Some believe that the
new standards under FISA will cause law enforcement agents to request a
FISA warrant rather than attempt to obtain a more stringent Title III
81. PATRIOT Act, supra note 42, at sec. 215.
82. Id.
83. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, http://www.pclob.gov/ (last
visited Sept. 18, 2014). See generally LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE
AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES (Dec. 12, 2013).
84. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE: THE REVIEW GROUP,
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/intelligence-community/review-group. See generally LIBERTY
AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESI-
DENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES (Dec.
12, 2013).
85. See USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. (2013-2014); Relevancy Act,
H.R. 2603, 113th Cong. (2013-2014); Surveillance Order Reporting Act of 2013, H.R. 3035,
113th Cong. (2013-2014): FISA Court Reform Act of 2013, H.R.3228, 113th Cong. (2013-
2014); FISA Transparency and Modernization Act, H.R. 4291, 113th Cong. (2013-2014);
H.Res. 590, 113th Cong. (2013-2014); FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act of
2013, S. 1215, 113th Cong. (2013-2014); FISA Court Reform Act of 2013, S. 1467, 113th
Cong. (2013-2014); Intelligence Oversight and Surveillance Reform Act, S. 1551, 113th
Cong. (2013-2014); USA FREEDOM Act, S. 1599, 113th Cong. (2013-2014); USA FREE-
DOM Act of 2014, S. 2685, 113th Cong. (2013-2014).
86. ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/
usapatriot/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2014); see also PATRIOT Act, supra note 42, at sec. 218.
87. Id.
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warrant for criminal evidence.88
In May 2002, a FISC judge held that section 218 was unconstitutional,
thereby rejecting the government’s attempt to dismantle the “wall” that
inhibited intelligence investigators from sharing FISA surveillance with
law enforcement and prosecutors.89 However, months later, the FISA
Court of Review overturned the ruling, stating “[s]o long as the govern-
ment entertains a realistic option of dealing with the agent other than
through criminal prosecution, it satisfies the significant purpose test.”90
The court noted the seamless nature of intelligence and law enforcement
inquiries; for example, foreign intelligence information might necessarily
evidence criminal conduct like espionage.91 In light of this nexus, the
court wrote “a standard which punishes such cooperation could well be
thought dangerous to national security.”92 The court concluded that the
balance struck in the amended FISA was consistent with concerns in the
1960s and 1970s about domestic wiretapping that had led to the creation
of FISA in the first place.93 Therefore “the FISA as amended is constitu-
tional because the surveillances it authorizes are reasonable.”94
E. DISCLOSURE OF THE NSA’S TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
On December 16, 2005, the New York Times ran an article revealing
that for four years, the NSA had monitored the communications of
Americans without obtaining warrants from the FISC in violation of
FISA.95 The legal authority for these wiretaps came from the executive
branch and with the approval of the Department of Justice.96
Following the news article, the DOJ issued a public memorandum ex-
plaining that the program applied to communications where at least one
party was located outside of the United States.97 The program was meant
to focus on members of al Qaeda and affiliated groups, and interceptions
would occur “if there is a reasonable basis to believe that one party to the
communication is a member of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a
member of an organization affiliated with al Qaeda.”98 The memo also
argued that the President had legal authority to authorize the NSA “ter-
rorist surveillance program” as Commander-in-Chief and Chief Execu-
tive and that the President had “inherent authority to conduct
88. BAKER, supra note 33, at 85.
89. In re All Matters Submitted to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611, 729 (FISA Ct. 2002).
90. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 735 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
91. Id. at 743.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 746.
94. Id.
95. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program
.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
96. Id.
97. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 68, at 2.
98. Id.
440 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68
warrantless surveillance to gather foreign intelligence even in peace-
time.”99 Moreover, the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)
passed by Congress after the September 11th attacks authorized the Pres-
ident to use “all necessary and appropriate military force against those
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided in the terrorist attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001,” which included the authority to authorize the surveillance
program.100
It was later disclosed that then-White House counsel Alberto Gonzales
and DOJ lawyer John Yoo had written memos justifying the legality of
these NSA surveillance programs and finding that the special needs ex-
ception to the warrant requirement applied in this set of circumstances.
In his memo, John Yoo pointed to Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,
where the Court explained that a warrantless search can be constitutional
“when special needs, beyond the normal need of law enforcement, make
the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.”101 He also
explained, “the Court has found warrantless searches reasonable when
there are ‘exigent circumstances,’ such as threat to the safety of law en-
forcement or third parties.”102
Moreover, even if the NSA’s surveillance targeted U.S. persons, includ-
ing those inside the United States, the administration decided that any
communication involving foreign parties made the entire communication
“foreign intelligence.”103 Yoo wrote in a later memo, “unless Congress
made a clear statement in FISA that it sought to restrict presidential au-
thority to conduct warrantless searches in the national security area—
which it has not—then the statute must be construed to avoid such a
reading.”104
Even though Congress had intended FISA to be a check on the presi-
dent’s surveillance powers,105 the administration believed the FISA pro-
cess impeded the swift approach of catching terrorists if the NSA had to
wait for a federal judge to issue a warrant for each and every suspect who
appeared. Under the inherent powers of the President and the executive
99. Id. at 1.
100. Id.
101. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to David S.
Kris, Assoc. Deputy Attorney Gen. 2 (Sept. 25, 2001) (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 515




104. Memorandum for the Attorney Gen. from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attor-
ney Gen. (Nov. 2, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/
2011/03/25/johnyoo-memo-for-ag.pdf. Matthew Aid submitted an FOIA request to the
DOJ in October, 2009. In a response dated August 10, 2011, the DOJ stated that it “[was]
withholding two of the documents in full pursuant to FOIA Exemptions One and Five, 5
U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(1) & (5) (2007 & Supp. 2014), because they are classified and are pro-
tected by the deliberative process privilege.” See Matthew Aid, FOIA Request to Justice
Department, available at http://fas.org/sgp/news/2011/08/aid-olc.pdf.
105. FISA of 1978, supra note 37.
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branch,106 the NSA had the authorization to intercept Americans inside
the country without a warrant as long as one party to the communication
was outside the United States and the analyst reasonably suspected one
party was a terrorist or an associate or member of an organization affili-
ated with terrorism, specifically al Qaeda.107
F. CONGRESS’S RESPONSE: THE PROTECT AMERICA ACT OF 2007 AND
THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 (SECTION 702)
The Protect America Act was a temporary surveillance law that was
enacted in 2007 and meant to expire in one year.108 The government ar-
gued in support of the bill that,
changes in technology since 1978 had the effect of expanding the
scope of FISA’s coverage to include intelligence collection efforts
that Congress excluded from the law’s requirements. This unin-
tended expansion of FISA’s scope meant the government, in a signif-
icant number of cases, needed to obtain a court order to collect
foreign intelligence information against a target located overseas.
This created an unnecessary obstacle to our Intelligence Commu-
nity’s ability to gain real-time information about the intent of our
enemies overseas and diverted scarce resources that would be better
spent safeguarding the civil liberties of people in the United States,
not foreign terrorists who wish to do us harm.109
The “changes in technology since 1978” referred to the fact that FISA
statutory language had been interpreted such that if an electronic com-
munication touched a fiber optic cable in the United States, the NSA
would need a FISA warrant before it could monitor the conversation.110
This proved to be a problem with quick, real-time surveillance of a for-
eign target.111
The Protect America Act was designed to allow the IC to collect for-
eign intelligence information on targets in foreign lands without first re-
ceiving FISA court approval, as well as protect third parties from private
lawsuits arising from the assistance they provide the IC.112 Thus, the IC
would be able to obtain blanket authorizations (as long as targeting and
minimization procedures are approved by the FISC) and not individual
warrants to target non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located
106. Article II of the Constitution designates the president as Commander-in-Chief and
gives him authority over foreign affairs. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
107. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 68, at 2.
108. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552 (codified at 50
U.S.C.A. §§ 1805a to 1805c (2003 & Supp. 2014)).
109. THE WHITE HOUSE, GEORGE W. BUSH, FACT SHEET: THE PROTECT AMERICA
ACT OF 2007 (Aug. 6, 2007), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2007/08/20070806-5.html.
110. JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-SECRET NSA FROM 9/11
TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA 298 (Anchor Books, 2009).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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outside the United States.113 The FISC would review the IC procedures
used to ensure that they had a reasonable basis to believe that the targets
were of foreign intelligence value, and that the surveillance was not in-
tended to target Americans.114 Unfortunately, although the Protect
America Act specifically did not permit the warrantless surveillance of
U.S. persons inside the United States, the fear was that “thousands, po-
tentially hundreds of thousands, of Americans’ communications would be
swept up as the NSA monitored the global telecom system.”115 The Pro-
tect America Act gave the government extraordinary surveillance pow-
ers, and thus, Congress placed its trust in the fact that the Attorney
General would submit to the FISC the procedures being used so there
would be some sort of outside review.116 In turn, the FISA judges had to
rely on the government’s assurances that these massive new surveillances
and targeting and minimization procedures were not inadvertently col-
lecting the conversations of people they should not monitor.117
Since the Protect America Act was only to last one year, Congress
passed the FISA Amendments Act of 2008118 (otherwise known as sec-
tion 702 or FAA), which has been criticized as authorizing most of the
powers that the Bush administration had used under its Terrorist Surveil-
lance Program.119 Section 702 was not much different from the Protect
America Act. It gave the government authority to monitor communica-
tions outside the FISA or Title III traditional warrant process and set
forth “procedures for targeting certain persons outside the United States
other than United States persons.”120 The Amendments stated, “[t]he At-
torney General and the Director of National Intelligence may authorize
jointly, for a period of up to 1 year from the effective date of the authori-
zation, the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be located outside
the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.”121
Minimization procedures were established in the 702 programs in order
to protect the privacy of U.S. persons inadvertently monitored.122 The
content and identity of the U.S. person must be deleted unless (1) there is
a reasonable belief the phone call between the foreign target and the U.S.
113. HARRIS, supra note 50, at 341; Protect America Act of 2007, supra note 108.
114. Id.; Protect America Act of 2007, supra note 108.
115. Id. at 341–42.
116. Id. at 342.
117. See THE WHITE HOUSE, GEORGE W. BUSH, supra note 109.
118. H.R. 6304, 110th Cong. (2007-2008), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
BILLS-110hr6304enr/pdf/BILLS-110hr6304enr.pdf.
119. Jacob Sommer, FISA Authority and Blanket Surveillance: A Gatekeeper Without
Opposition, 40 No. 3 LITIGATION, (Spring 2014), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
publications/litigation_journal/2013-14/spring/fisa_authority_and_blanket_surveillance_
gatekeeper_without_opposition.html.
120. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881(a) (2003 & Supp. 2014).
121. Id.
122. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE SURVEIL-
LANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT (July 2, 2014), available at http://www.pclob.gov/All%20Documents/
Report%20on%20the%20Section%20702%20Program/PCLOB-Section-702-Report-
PRE-RELEASE.pdf.
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person contains significant foreign intelligence, (2) the call reveals evi-
dence of a crime, (3) the call is encrypted, or (4) the U.S. person poses a
threat of serious harm to life or property.123
Therefore, the NSA was authorized to target only foreign persons in
foreign countries outside the warrant process and not persons in the
United States, United States persons located in foreign countries, or per-
sons located outside the United States “if the purpose of such acquisition
[wa]s to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in
the United States.”124 Moreover, the NSA must certify to the FISC that
“a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence
information” rather than the previous certification that “the purpose” is
to obtain foreign intelligence information.125
As with section 215’s telephone metadata collection program, there are
critics of section 702. Most of the criticisms focus on 702’s minimization
and targeting procedures and the perceived lack of enforcement of these
procedures. The concern is that Americans’ conversations are routinely
being collected and inadvertently being analyzed. Contrary to their con-
cerns with section 215, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
and President’s Review Group have found the 702 program to be legal,
relatively effective, and valuable.126
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NSA AND THE DEA
AND “PARALLEL CONSTRUCTION”
After the initial Snowden disclosures in June 2013, a series of articles
came out expanding on the impact the NSA intercepts had on other law
enforcement agencies. On August 5, 2013, Reuters published an article
indicating that law enforcement agencies such as the DEA were using
NSA intercepts,127 wiretaps by foreign governments, court-approved do-
mestic wiretaps, and phone log databases to initiate criminal investiga-
tions.128 The article used the acronym “DICE” to refer to a phone log
and Internet data database, which is said to contain approximately one
billion records which were gathered legally by the DEA through “sub-
poenas, arrests and search warrants nationwide.”129 It is used so that law
enforcement agents can “connect the dots” and make connections be-
tween targets of investigations.130
123. Id.
124. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1881a(b)(1-4) (2003 & Supp. 2014).
125. Id. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(v) (2003 & Supp. 2014) (emphasis added).
126. LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 83.
127. The Reuters article did not reveal whether the intercepts came from the FISA
warrant process and/or Section 702 programs and/or Executive Order 12,333. The section
215 bulk collection telephony metadata would not be considered a source as that program
deals only with metadata and any U.S. person information can only be used in counterter-
rorism investigations.
128. Shiffman & Cooke, supra note 2.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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According to Reuters, initial information derived from the previously
mentioned sources is effectively “scrubbed” at a central location called
the Special Operations Division (SOD) before being sent out to field
agents with the DEA, Internal Revenue Service, FBI, and Homeland Se-
curity.131 The SOD’s main function is to act as the central coordinator for
multi-jurisdictional and international investigations, “connecting agents
in separate cities who may be unwittingly investigating the same target
and making sure undercover agents don’t accidentally try to arrest each
other.”132
Reuters uncovered internal DEA PowerPoint presentation slides which
encouraged “agents to omit the SOD’s involvement [in the collection of
tips] from investigative reports, affidavits, discussions with prosecutors
and courtroom testimony. Agents are instructed to then use ‘normal in-
vestigative techniques to recreate the information provided by the
SOD.’”133 Normal investigative techniques would include “independent
sources [such] as investigative files, subscriber and toll requests, physical
surveillance, wire intercepts, and confidential source information.”134
The practice of taking a classified tip, which SOD prefers not to be
used as evidence, and conducting a separate investigation and developing
independent evidence that would be admissible at trial has been called
“parallel construction.”135 Reuters found DEA sources that said, “Paral-
lel construction is a law enforcement technique we use every day . . . it’s
decades old, a bedrock concept.”136
Since this disclosure, defense attorneys and others have argued that
“parallel construction” violates a defendant’s constitutional rights to a
fair trial and to confront witnesses against him/her, and violates pretrial
discovery rules by burying evidence that could prove useful to criminal
defendants.137 By circumventing court procedures for weighing whether
sensitive, classified, or FISA evidence must be disclosed to a defendant,
the practice of “parallel construction” prevents the defendant from know-
ing about evidence that might be exculpatory and arguably prevents an
opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the investigation. It also mis-
leads the court.138 If defendants are not informed as to how an investiga-
tion began, “they cannot know to ask to review potential sources of




134. John Shiffman & David Ingram, Exclusive: IRS manual detailed DEA’s use of hid-
den intel evidence, REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/07/us-
dea-irs-idUSBRE9761AZ20130807.
135. Id.
136. Shiffman & Cooke, supra note 2.
137. Id.
138. Id.; Hanni Fakhoury, DEA and NSA Team Up to Share Intelligence, Leading to
Secret Use of Surveillance in Ordinary Investigations, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 6,
2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/dea-and-nsa-team-intelligence-laundering.
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takes or biased witnesses.”139
Several senators and congressmen asked former Attorney General Eric
Holder to answer questions about the Reuters report, and the DOJ is
currently said to be reviewing the practice.140 Some senators wrote,
“[t]hese allegations raise serious concerns that gaps in the policy and law
are allowing overreach by the federal government’s intelligence gathering
apparatus.”141 The DEA has stated the practice is legal, and the purpose
is to protect confidential sources and investigative methods, not to with-
hold evidence.142
Some critics have gone so far as to argue that parallel construction is
doublespeak for “intelligence laundering” and that “the SOD’s insulation
from even judges and prosecutors stops federal courts from assessing the
constitutionality of the government’s surveillance practices.”143
Because so little has been said publicly about the allegations, there are
bound to be misinterpretations of this particular DEA policy. Some com-
mented “[i]t certainly can’t be that the agents can make up a ‘parallel
construction,’ a made-up tale, in court documents, testimony before the
grand jury or a judge, without disclosure to a court.”144 One former fed-
eral judge is quoted as saying, “It sounds like they are phonying up
investigations.”145
Upon disclosure of this new information, the question to be asked is
two-fold:
1. How do courts handle information that is typically used to initiate a
criminal investigation? Is that information, if not used as evidence at
trial, nevertheless discoverable?
2. How do courts handle this recently revealed information (to include
NSA intercepts, intelligence sharing from wiretaps by foreign gov-
ernments, court-approved domestic wiretaps, and phone log
databases)? Is this information also discoverable or should it be im-
mune from court scrutiny merely because the material came from a
classified source or technique?
A TYPICAL INITIATION OF AN INVESTIGATION: FROM HUNCH/TIP TO
PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST
Criminal investigations, drug cases in particular, have many origins.
Some of the more common ways a case is initiated is through an anony-
139. Shiffman & Cooke, supra note 2.
140. John Shiffman, Holder pressed on U.S. drug agency use of hidden data evidence,
REUTERS (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/27/us-usa-security-dea-
idUSBRE97P0Y520130827.
141. Id.
142. Shiffman, supra note 140.
143. Fakhoury, supra note 138.
144. David Ingram & John Shiffman, U.S. defense lawyers to seek access to DEA hidden
intelligence evidence, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/08/
us-dea-irs-idUSBRE9761AZ20130808.
145. Shiffman & Cooke, supra note 2.
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mous tip to the DEA or local law enforcement (“I think my neighbor is
growing marijuana in his home”), or an ex-girlfriend or spouse (there’s
nothing like a woman scorned), or a friend, family member, or co-worker
who has contacted the authorities and would like for them to investigate
suspected criminal activity.
Another common way investigations are initiated is through a defen-
dant’s encounter with the police (e.g., traffic stop) or encounter with a
confidential informant working with the DEA. Sometimes, an investiga-
tion is simply a spin-off from another local investigation targeting a dif-
ferent group of defendants or an investigation or wiretap that began in
another state. The fire department is also sometimes called to put out a
fire at a home that turns out to be a meth lab. This type of information is
turned over to local law enforcement for further investigation and poten-
tial prosecution.
In order to evaluate whether hiding the tools described in the Reuters’
report is lawful and whether “parallel construction” is an acceptable prac-
tice, it is important to also evaluate these initial investigative tools that
are normally not disclosed to the defendant until closer to trial, or many
times, not at all.
It is also important to review a prosecutor’s discovery obligations. A
defendant is not entitled to every piece of information collected during an
investigation.146 Discovery rules are reciprocal and govern what the de-
fendant and prosecution are entitled to pre-trial.147
Federal prosecutors must comply with discovery obligations under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,148 the United States Constitution,
and the court’s inherent supervisory power.149 Prosecutors have a duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland150 and evidence
that would tend to impeach the credibility of cooperating government
witnesses under Giglio v. United States.151 Lastly, prosecutors must turn
over to the defense any Jencks Act material, which would be any previous
statements signed or adopted by a witness that relates to the subject mat-
ter of the testimony of the witness, at the close of a witness’s direct exam-
ination, and preferably earlier.152
146. Classified Information Procedures Act [hereinafter CIPA], Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94
Stat. 2025 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16).
147. Id.
148. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
149. “Some judges use this authority to issue orders requiring the disclosure of certain
information, such as the names and addresses of the witnesses who will be called to tes-
tify.” NEIL P. COHEN, DONALD J. HALL & STANLEY E. ADELMAN, CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE PROCESS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 276 (3d ed. 2008).
150. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). “We now hold that the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id.
151. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
152. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b); see FED. R.
CRIM. P. 26.2 (incorporating Jencks Act requirements into the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure).
2015] NSA & DEA Intelligence Sharing 447
Discovery obligations are required in order to promote fairness to the
defendant and promote good faith on the part of the prosecution in its
ability to obtain statements, information, or items within the United
States government’s possession, custody, or control. Compared to civil
litigation, discovery in a criminal proceeding is adversarial in nature.
Those that argue against liberal discovery fear the defense will intimidate
government witnesses or fabricate a defense or commit perjury based
upon the prosecution’s known theory of the case.153 Significant discovery
is now the rule rather than the exception. From 1963 to 1985, with cases
such as Brady, Giglio, Bagley,154 Kyles,155 and Agurs,156 the Supreme
Court began to place discovery obligations on the prosecution and also
demanded reciprocal discovery.157 While the truth is supposed to emerge
from an adversarial system, courts worry that it will not and that rules of
discovery must be put in place to ensure fairness.158
On a defendant’s request, F.R.C.P. 16(a)(1)(A)–(G) requires that the
government disclose the defendant’s statements, prior record, certain
documents and tangible items, reports of examinations and tests, and
written summaries of expert witness testimony.
A. ANONYMOUS TIPS, INFORMANTS, AND COOPERATING WITNESSES
An anonymous tip, which is considered hearsay and inadmissible at
trial, is typically not disclosed to the defense. A tip would not be consid-
ered discoverable unless it is somehow exculpatory. At trial, an agent
cannot testify as to what the tip said but can mention what he/she did as a
result of receiving the tip.159
Informants160 and cooperating witnesses are also regularly used in drug
investigations. Oftentimes, informants will suggest a particular target or
case to an agent, and the agent will then decide whether to open an inves-
tigation. Once the case is initiated, the informant will meet with the target
and, hopefully, record meetings and telephone conversations in order to
153. JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE: ADJUDICATION 156 (4th ed. 2006).
154. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (explaining that favorable evidence is
material if there is a “reasonable probability” that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different).
155. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (defining the materiality standard in terms of
the cumulative effect of all suppressed evidence favorable to the defense, not the evidence
considered item-by-item).
156. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (“A fair analysis of the holding in
Brady indicates that implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the sup-
pressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial.”).
157. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (holding that requiring defendant to dis-
close his alibi defense to the government prior to trial does not violate his Fifth Amend-
ment right against compulsory self-discrimination); see also FED. R. CRIM P. 12.1–12.3
(reciprocal discovery).
158. Williams, 399 U.S. at 78.
159. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
160. Informants are distinguished from cooperating witnesses as they are paid for their
information, given immunity for past criminal acts, or charged with a lesser crime in return
for their cooperation with the government.
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develop probable cause. Many times, the agent will attempt to cut the
informant out of the investigation and place an undercover agent in the
informant’s stead in order to protect the informant’s identity. Any previ-
ous drug buys done with the informant will be excluded from any charges
in the future indictment.161 This is particularly useful if the informant has
considerable baggage, such as a significant criminal history, acts of vio-
lence, prior inconsistent statements, and other impeachment evidence
that could be used at trial.
The identity of an informant may be protected if he or she does not
testify.162 If an informant’s information is used for intelligence purposes
only and not at trial, there is a greater likelihood that the informant’s
identity can be protected. If the informant will not be called as a witness
at trial, the defense will need to demonstrate that disclosure is “relevant
and helpful to the defense of the accused, or is essential to a fair determi-
nation of a cause.”163 The purpose of the privilege is to encourage citizens
to communicate such information to law enforcement officers by protect-
ing their anonymity, and the scope of the privilege is limited by this pur-
pose. Another government interest in non-disclosure lies in the fact that
the disclosure of an informant could compromise other ongoing criminal
investigations.164
In Roviaro, the Supreme Court considered the application of the in-
formant’s privilege to the general discovery rules, pursuant to which the
government may withhold from disclosure the identity of its infor-
mants.165 The Court noted that the privilege implicates two fundamental
competing interests: (1) the interest of the defendant in mounting a de-
fense; and (2) the public interest in enabling the government to protect its
sources.166 The Court relied on two basic principles to resolve the com-
peting interests. First, it noted that the defendant’s interest was triggered
only when information in the government’s possession was “relevant and
helpful.”167 Second, when the evidence is deemed relevant and helpful,
the Court held, resolving the interests “calls for balancing the public in-
terest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right
to prepare his defense.”168 In order to determine whether the informer’s
privilege must give way to the defendant’s right to prepare his defense,
the Eleventh Circuit listed three factors that must be considered: (1) the
extent of the informant’s participation in the criminal activity; (2) the re-
161. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) (setting forth the government’s in-
formant privilege).
162. See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 (1938); Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 59
(“What is usually referred to as the informer’s privilege is in reality the government’s privi-
lege to withhold from disclosure the identity of persons who furnish information of viola-
tions of law to officers charged with enforcement of that law.”); United States v. Fuentes,
988 F. Supp. 861 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
163. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 59.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 55.
166. Id. at 62.
167. Id. at 60–62.
168. Id. at 62.
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lationship between the defendant’s asserted defense and the informant’s
probable testimony; and (3) the government’s interest in non-
disclosure.169
Even an informant’s substantial role in an investigation, without more,
will not warrant disclosure generally.170 The defendant has the burden of
showing that the informant’s testimony would significantly aid in estab-
lishing an asserted defense171 or that the informant was an active partici-
pant in the criminal matter.172 Mere conjecture about the possible
relevance of the informant’s testimony is insufficient to warrant
disclosure.173
As an alternative, courts have suggested the informant’s identity not be
revealed, but rather the informant should be made available for trial or
for a defense counsel interview beforehand.174
Why would a defendant want to know the identity of an informant or
cooperating witness if the witness will not be testifying at trial? Many
times, the defendant wants to know the identity of the person who gave
him up to the police, which can put the cooperator at risk for retaliation.
Or, the defendant simply wants to know how they got caught so they can
learn not to make the same mistake in the future. Usually, the defendant
will be able to gather who the “informer” is from the law enforcement
reports that are turned over during discovery.
B. TITLE III WIRETAP INTERCEPTIONS
Another common investigatory tool is to use a Title III wiretap to
gather sufficient probable cause175 against a particular target or group of
individuals involved in drug trafficking and money laundering activities.
Oftentimes, a wire intercept will reveal new players in a drug trafficking
conspiracy and create spin-off investigations.
Title 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 governs the lawful interception of wire and
electronic communications.176 To obtain authorization for the intercep-
tion of wire or electronic communication, the affidavit must allege a vio-
lation of a federal offense177 and must disclose the identities of the
169. United States v. Tenorio-Angel, 756 F.2d 1505, 1509 (11th Cir. 1985).
170. United States v. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d 1482, 1490–91 (11th Cir. 1991).
171. Id. at 1491; United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Warren, 42 F.3d 647 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
172. United States v. Kerris, 748 F.2d 610, 613–14 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Gaston, 357 F.3d 77, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2004); McLawhorn v. North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1, 5 (4th
Cir. 1973).
173. Gutierrez, 931 F.2d at 1491.
174. United States v. McDonald, 935 F.2d 1212 (11th Cir. 1991).
175. See supra text accompanying note 45.
176. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510 (2000 & Supp. 2014) defines types of communication that can
be intercepted. Wire communications are those communications that pass through a tele-
phone line/wire while electronic communications refer to the interception of non-voice
communications such as text messaging, email, fax, and over the internet.
177. To obtain authorization of the interception of wire communications, the federal
offense must be listed in 18 U.S.C.A. § 2516(1) and listed in 2516(3) (2000 & Supp. 2014)
for the interception of electronic communications.
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targets, their criminal behavior, and how the targeted device/facility
(phone, email account, etc.) is used in furtherance of the criminal activ-
ity.178 An affidavit for a Title III wiretap is extensively reviewed within
the United States’ Attorney’s Office before the Criminal Division’s Of-
fice of Enforcement Operations reviews it.179 Once the affidavit is final-
ized, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General must review the affidavit and
authorize the prosecutor to proceed to seek approval from the district
court judge.180
Many times, multiple wiretaps targeting one large drug trafficking or
money laundering operation are being monitored at the same time.
Agents attempt to keep these wiretaps under wraps until the entire inves-
tigation is finished. If it is a multi-district investigation, a significant
amount of coordination is needed to ensure all wires and arrests are com-
pleted at the same time or risk defendants becoming fugitives, warning
other targets, and destroying evidence.
In order to prevent the wire from being disclosed but developing addi-
tional evidence outside the wire, agents will “wall off” the wiretap and
have state and local police initiate a traffic stop and collect evidence. Po-
lice must find their own probable cause to stop the vehicle (e.g., observe a
traffic violation) rather than use any probable cause that comes from a
particular conversation on the wire. It is irrelevant whether the police
would have stopped the vehicle under the general practice of the police
department181 or whether the officer may have had other subjective mo-
tives for stopping the vehicle as long as they had probable cause to be-
lieve a traffic law was violated.182
For example, during a particular intercepted conversation, a target may
refer to “twenty window panes” that he will deliver tomorrow at three
p.m. to a particular location. Agents have previously surveilled the tar-
get’s home and know which car he drives. The agents working the case
alert the local state trooper as to the particular car and the area where it
might be found at three p.m. The following day, the state trooper identi-
fies the target’s car on the highway and observes him speeding. The target
is issued a speeding ticket and consents to the search of his car. The of-
ficer finds twenty kilograms of cocaine hidden underneath the back seat
of the car. If the cocaine is seized and the target is free to leave, the
wiretap need not be disclosed. If the target is subsequently arrested, the
wiretap need not be disclosed until the discovery process and, even then,
it is possible that state discovery rules may delay discovery or not require
178. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518 (2000).
179. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL (USAM), TITLE 9, CRIMINAL RES.
MANUAL 29, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/
crm00029.htm.
180. Id.
181. United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir. 1996).
182. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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disclosure unless exculpatory evidence exists on the wire.183
There have also been occasions in which a Title III wiretap has not
been disclosed in a search warrant affidavit, even though it was part of
the probable cause used to obtain the warrant in order to protect ongoing
investigations. Instead, the source of the information has been said to
come from a confidential informant rather than the true source, the Title
III wiretap.184 The key to approval hinged on whether the agent informed
the magistrate judge of the information’s true source before the magis-
trate signed the warrant. In United States v. Glinton,185 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit stated:
In a broad generic sense, the wiretap served as a reliable provider, or
“informant,” of information. If there had been a live confidential in-
formant under the circumstances set forth here, the government
would not have been required to reveal the informant’s name. We
certainly do not condone a position that it is proper to lie under oath
in a search warrant affidavit as long as the affiant orally tells the
truth to the issuing magistrate judge. However in this instance, we do
not feel that the warrant should be suppressed because the magis-
trate judge was not “misled by information.” The fact that a wiretap
was the basis for gaining confidential information does not detract
from the reliability or veracity of the source. In fact, upon learning of
the means by which this information was obtained, the magistrate
judge could gain reassurance as to the veracity of the information.186
While Title III affidavits must be placed under seal, the government
may use information from Title III affidavits or recordings in arrest war-
rants, search warrants, complaints, indictments, and trial briefs.187 When
Title III affidavits or documents containing Title III information must be
disclosed in response to discovery requests, the government may seek a
protective order asking the court to redact or keep the pleadings sealed if
there are ongoing investigations that may be compromised.188 Defense
counsel may also be precluded from sharing contents of the Title III affi-
davit and recordings with others outside the defendant and the defense
team.189
183. If a federal prosecution ensues, the recordings of the defendant on the wiretap will
eventually be disclosed under FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(B)(i).
184. United States v. Cruz, 594 F.2d 268, 271–72 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984); State v. Beney, 523 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); cf.
United States v. McCain, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“Courts have re-
jected the notion that law enforcement may make misrepresentations in warrant affidavits
in order to protect the confidentiality of their sources.”); United States v. Broward, 594
F.2d 345, 351 (2d Cir. 1979) (“We emphatically do not condone the insertion of false mate-
rial into affidavits for arrest or search warrants. Such an egregious practice defeats the
whole point of the procedure, having a judicial officer make an independent assessment of
whether probable cause exists.”).
185. 154 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 1998) (where the magistrate did not know that the “confi-
dential source” was actually a wiretap).
186. Id. at 1255 (citation omitted).
187. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2517(1)–(2) (2000 & Supp. 2014).
188. CIPA, supra note 146, § 4.
189. Id.
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C. TOLL RECORDS/PHONE LOG DATA190 VIA ADMINISTRATIVE OR
GRAND JURY SUBPOENA AND PHONE LOG DATABASES
Many investigations begin as spin-offs from other investigations. For
example, a target whose phone calls are being intercepted by the DEA is
found calling an individual who happens to be distributing narcotics in
another area of town or different district and is looking for another sup-
plier. An agent would then request toll records from the individual’s
phone provider and see if there are any additional links between the indi-
vidual’s phone and other “known” drug distributors, buyers, suppliers, or
co-conspirators. Toll records can include the date, time, and duration of
incoming and outgoing phone numbers of calls.191 If the agent finds suffi-
cient information from toll records, as well as from surveillance, cooper-
ating witnesses, and informants, then the agent may want to place a trap
and trace192 or pen register device193 on that particular phone number to
capture the phone numbers of all incoming and outgoing calls to that
particular number. By doing this, the agent is attempting to see if there
are any connections between this individual and a drug trafficking organi-
zation. Wire interceptions of the new phone number may be necessary in
order to further identify co-conspirators, supervisors or suppliers, or un-
derstand the scope of the ongoing conspiracy.
The Reuters article indicated that some of the leads sent out to the
field came from a phone log and Internet data database, which contains
approximately one billion records that were gathered legally by the DEA
190. Meaning “any record (except a record pertaining to content) maintained by an
electronic communication service provider identifying the telephone numbers called from
a particular telephone or attributable to a particular account for which a communication
service provider might charge a service fee. The term includes but is not limited to all
records maintained of individual calls made from a particular telephone or attributed to it
that are or could be the subject of a particularized charge depending upon the billing plan
offered by the provider and accepted by the customer. In other words, the term is broad
enough to cover all records of calls from or attributed to a particular number regardless of
whether, in fact, a separate charge is assessed for each call. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas to
Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 355, 356 (W.D. Mo. 1995). 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709
(2000 & Supp. 2014) governs access to telephone toll and transactional records.
191. See Toll Records, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/files/cell
phonetracking/20120328/celltrackingpra_renopd_renonv_4.pdf.pdf (last visited June 5,
2015).
192. “[T]he term ‘trap and trace device’ means a device or process which captures the
incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other dial-
ing, routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source
of a wire or electronic communication, provided, however, that such information shall not
include the contents of any communication.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(4) (2000 & Supp. 2014).
193. [T]he term ‘pen register’ means a device or process which records or decodes dial-
ing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility
from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that
such information shall not include the contents of any communication, but such term does
not include any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic
communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communica-
tions services provided by such provider or any device or process used by a provider or
customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the
ordinary course of its business. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3127(3).
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through “subpoenas, arrests and search warrants nationwide.”194
The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) on its own website stated:
The OIG is examining the DEA’s use of administrative subpoenas
to obtain broad collections of data or information. The review will
address the legal authority for the acquisition or use of these data
collections; the existence and effectiveness of any policies and proce-
dural safeguards established with respect to the collection, use, and
retention of the data; the creation, dissemination, and usefulness of
any products generated from the data; and the use of ‘parallel con-
struction’ or other techniques to protect the confidentiality of these
programs.195
The concern here is similar to the concern of the collection of data by
the NSA—the DEA is collecting various metadata on citizens, compiling
it into one database, and accessing the data at will. However, the DEA
acquired its information legally and in a different manner, i.e., via admin-
istrative and grand jury subpoenas issued during particular investigations.
Subscriber-type information and billing records may be obtained on a
case-by-case basis via administrative or grand jury subpoena pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c) pro-
vides that the court can quash or modify the subpoena for records on a
particular investigation if compliance would be unreasonable or oppres-
sive. On the other hand, the NSA database as described by Snowden,
including data about every telephone call placed inside the United States,
“is not used for domestic criminal law enforcement,”196 and is not col-
lected via subpoena power on a case-by-case basis but is gathered up
wholesale from internet and telephone carriers’ systems. Thus, NSA and
DEA databases are entirely different.
The question becomes whether DEA should be able to hold onto the
subpoena results after that particular investigation has been completed
and whether that information can be compiled into one large database,
which can later be accessed during other investigations. In essence, the
database is streamlining the subpoena process so agents will not have to
wait for results from telecommunications providers and can re-access in-
formation that has already been requested via subpoena and received
from third parties. Telephone and Internet providers can sometimes take
weeks to process toll record requests. If the records are already available
in a database, agents will be able to make connections between targets of
investigations quickly and attempt to “keep up with drug dealers when
they switch phone numbers to try to avoid detection.”197
194. Shiffman & Cooke, supra note 2.
195. Ongoing Work, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DRUG ENF’T
ADMIN., http://www.justice.gov/oig/ongoing/dea.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2014).
196. Ingram & Shiffman, supra note 144.
197. Scott Shane & Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, Eclipsing
N.S.A.’s, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/
us/drug-agents-use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
(“[R]ecords are maintained at all times by the phone company, not the government. . . .
454 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68
Clearly, collecting legally acquired subscriber information from indi-
vidual subpoenas into one database is cost effective. Third party service
providers more than likely will not preserve this data for a significant
period of time, and if asked to do so, would more than likely require a
hefty fee from the government or pass the cost onto the consumer. Then,
the data would be placed into a third party’s hands with little or no over-
sight compared to government oversight of the database by entities such
as Congress and the Office of the Inspector General (OIG).
As for discovery concerns, there does not appear to be any require-
ment under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (Rule 16) to turn over
toll records unless they will be used at trial or for some reason they would
be considered exculpatory.
D. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT LAWFUL WIRETAPS
Foreign government wiretaps could be useful to U.S. domestic law en-
forcement agents. Foreign wire intercepts, similar to out-of-state wire in-
tercepts, potentially provide information as to new co-conspirators in a
large drug trafficking organization. This information could be useful in
the initiation of new investigations, provide support to ongoing local in-
vestigations through the use of search warrant or wiretap applications,
and used as evidence at trial.198
Some foreign law enforcement agencies conduct unauthorized wiretaps
for intelligence purposes. “In those cases, the foreign authorities may not
allow the wiretap evidence to be used in an American court or referenced
in search warrant affidavits or Title III affidavits.”199 Also, procedures in
foreign countries may be different from the way a wiretap is conducted in
our domestic investigations–there may be circumstances in which the
U.S. prosecutor is unable to obtain all recordings or legal documents re-
questing and granting authorization for the foreign wiretap.200
Courts have held that Title III standards do not apply to electronic
interceptions conducted outside the United States. Title III and its re-
quirements of probable cause and procedures such as minimization, peri-
odic reports, and the sealing of recordings, do not apply to wiretaps
conducted by foreign authorities in their own countries.201
[Hemisphere] simply streamlines the process of serving the subpoena to the phone
company . . . .”).
198. In United States v. Moreno, information about an imminent heroin transaction in
New York was obtained from a Colombian wiretap and was passed from a DEA agent in
Colombia to a DEA agent in New York. 08-CR-605, 2009 WL 454548 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24,
2009) aff’d, 701 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2012). In examining whether probable cause existed for
the arrest, the court found the Colombian wiretap to be reliable and that the information
from the wiretap had been independently corroborated by the agents in New York during
their surveillance of the target. Id.
199. Larry Schneider, Obtaining and Using Foreign Wiretap Evidence § 40.2, in U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL NARCOTICS PROSECUTIONS 926 (Mar. 2011).
200. Id. at 929.
201. United States v. Maturo, 982 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Peterson,
812 F.2d 486, 492 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Since foreign police in their own respective countries obtain foreign
wiretap evidence, foreign wiretap evidence can only be excluded at trial if
the conduct of the foreign agents shocks the conscience of the U.S. court
or if U.S. law enforcement officers substantially participate in the foreign
search.202
Discovery rules would apply as they do in domestic wiretap scenarios.
Recordings of the defendant must be turned over under Rule 16.
E. SYNOPSIS
Similar to the more familiar and established methods and sources used
by law enforcement to collect information and develop probable cause to
initiate a criminal investigation, other tools used by the DEA such as
court-approved domestic wiretaps, foreign government wiretaps, and
phone log databases are also legal forms of case-initiation and may or
may not be potentially discoverable according to Rule 16 and case law.
Anonymous tips, the identity of informants, and toll records would not
be considered discoverable under Rule 16 and need not be turned over to
the defense if they will not be used at trial. However, a prosecutor must
disclose the evidence if it is favorable to the defendant, material to the
defense, and it goes to the defendant’s guilt or punishment.203 Failure to
disclose such evidence, whether it is willful or inadvertent on the part of
the prosecution, violates due process and is grounds for reversing a con-
viction if the defendant can prove that non-disclosure was prejudicial to
his defense when the outcome would have been different if the undis-
closed evidence had been presented at trial.204 It is highly unlikely that an
anonymous tip or toll records would ever contain exculpatory evidence. If
an informant has exculpatory evidence on a defendant, that information
would clearly need to be turned over to the defense. However, an inform-
ant’s identity, as previously mentioned, need not be disclosed unless the
informant plans on testifying or the defense needs this information be-
cause it is “helpful” to its defense.205
Title III wiretaps and foreign wiretaps, on the other hand, implicate
Rule 16 if the wiretaps contain a recorded statement made by the defen-
dant, if “the statement is within the government’s possession, custody or
control,” and “the attorney for the government knows—or through due
diligence could know—that the statement exists.”206 These statements
must be turned over regardless of whether the government intends to use
the statements at trial.207 Moreover, the recordings may have exculpatory
evidence favorable to the defendant.
202. United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 1986); Maturo, 982 F.2d
at 60; United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 1995).
203. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
204. Id.; United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
205. Roviaro v United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).
206. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(B)(i).
207. United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 14 (D.D.C. 2005).
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Thus, the greatest concern discussed in the Reuters article lies in
DEA’s use of NSA intercepts and other classified material which is used
to initiate criminal investigations but this fact is not disclosed to the
defense.
IV. THE LEGALITY OF “PARALLEL CONSTRUCTION” AND
THE USE OF NSA INTERCEPTS TO INITIATE
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
A. “PARALLEL” VERSUS “CONSECUTIVE” CONSTRUCTION
Because the initial method of collection by the NSA is conducted sepa-
rate and apart from the subsequent DEA domestic investigation, the
term “parallel construction” is inappropriate. Rather, the term “consecu-
tive construction” is better suited in this context. The initial collection
intent is for intelligence, for foreign law enforcement purposes, or for
other positive intelligence investigations, and then relevant and substan-
tive information may be passed on to SOD for further evaluation.208 The
information is then analyzed, and a determination is made as to whether
it might be useful to other field investigations.209 Relevant information is
extracted from these sources and sent to the field with sufficient predica-
tion to encourage the field agent to begin an investigation. Thus, there is
no parallel investigation, but rather one in which information from one
potentially classified source is used to initiate a new criminal investiga-
tion. Once that investigation is initiated, the field agent develops his or
her own evidence, issuing subpoenas, conducting surveillance, interview-
ing witnesses, and developing probable cause in order to initiate a wire-
tap or conduct a search or an arrest.
B. STEP 1: WAS THE NSA INTERCEPT LEGALLY AUTHORIZED
AT THE TIME OF INTERCEPTION?
In evaluating the legality of this practice, we must determine whether
the NSA information disclosed to law enforcement was collected and ac-
cessed legally. From what has been publicly revealed, targets seem to be
monitored via FISA or section 702 authorization or Executive Order
12,333 (E.O. 12,333) if it is a foreign target intercepted overseas. For ex-
ample, a foreign narco-trafficker in Colombia speaking to an associate in
Mexico could be intercepted without a FISA warrant.210 A call between a
targeted Colombian trafficker and a domestic distributor is more of a
concern since the latter suspect may be a U.S. person who may later be a
target of a criminal investigation. It is also possible that the targeted Co-
lombian trafficker may be intercepted and extradited to the United States
to also face drug trafficking charges under Title 18 United States Code
section 959.
208. Shiffman & Cooke, supra note 2.
209. Id.
210. USSID 18, supra note 50; Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 31.
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1. Lawful NSA Intercept
If the information was collected and accessed legally under FISA or
702 or E.O. 12,333, the only outstanding concern is whether we approve
the policy of intelligence sharing between the IC and the domestic law
enforcement community. Should the IC, including the NSA, share intelli-
gence with law enforcement agents involved in wholly domestic criminal
investigations? It is highly likely if the NSA targets a foreign narco-traf-
ficker that it may inadvertently collect information on domestic distribu-
tors. If it is lawful for the NSA to collect data when there is a significant
foreign intelligence purpose, should NSA be allowed to pass along any
and all legally collected data, which may prove helpful to local law en-
forcement, even when the information collected contains U.S. person
information?
The 9/11 Commission was clear in its recommendation that the “wall”
be torn down between the IC and domestic law enforcement.211 How-
ever, the Commission used the example of FBI agents, some working for-
eign counterintelligence and others working criminal cases that were
involved in closely connected investigations, and those agents conducting
foreign counterintelligence were unable to share classified information
with criminal agents who were only cleared to view evidence that could
be used in court.212
Perhaps IC information should only be passed on to those involved in
terrorism cases as specified in the section 215, which describes the
metadata collection program. That would allow FBI agents working on
terrorism and espionage cases to have access to the information they
need to conduct additional domestic terrorism investigations and hope-
fully prevent another 9/11 from occurring, but also preclude local law en-
forcement uninvolved in terrorism investigations from accessing
intelligence gathered by the IC. On the other hand, why should legally
obtained intelligence information relevant to criminal activity in the U.S.
be withheld from domestic law enforcement merely because the suspect
is not a terrorist but rather a garden-variety criminal?
Part of the DEA’s mission is to work narco-terrorism cases. So far,
there have been several defendants indicted under the 21 U.S.C. § 960(a)
narco-terrorism statute. To name a few, Corredor-Ibaque was the first to
be indicted under the statute. He was a Colombian trafficker and mem-
ber of the FARC, an armed and violent organization that is engaged in
armed conflict against the government of the Republic of Colombia.213
Jimenez-Naranjo was a high-ranking leader of the Autodefensas Unidas
de Colombia (AUC), which is a Colombian right-wing paramilitary and
211. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 33.
212. Id. at 96.
213. Superseding Indictment at 1, United States v. Corredor-Ibague, No. 04-212
(D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2006), 2005 WL 6227984; Dep’t of Justice, High-level Columbian Drug
Trafficker Sentenced to 194 Months in Prison, Sept. 16, 2013, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2013/September/13-crm-1029.html.
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drug trafficking organization.214 Khan Mohammed was an associate of
the Taliban, an organization which “engage[d] in drug trafficking in order
to finance the acquisition of weapons, ammunition and equipment neces-
sary to conduct its attacks on coalition forces, the Afghan government
and anyone else who stands in their way.”215 Even though the narco-ter-
rorism statute was not created until 2006,216 Congress must have consid-
ered the DEA a likely user of IC-gathered information because part of
the NSA’s mission as described in Executive Order 12,333 is “to collect
information concerning, and conduct activities to protect against, interna-
tional terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, intelli-
gence activities directed against the United States, [and] international
criminal drug activities”.217 The IC is directed to “participate in law en-
forcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence ac-
tivities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics
activities.”218
Intelligence sharing has its benefits. Why should law enforcement not
receive the benefit of intelligence initially derived for a different pur-
pose? Perhaps rather than simply permitting any evidence of a crime to
be passed on, Congress should elaborate on what particular crimes it
deems sufficiently serious to justify the sharing of IC-related information
with domestic law enforcement. One repercussion of re-building the wall
(partially or otherwise) would be the reinstitution of the IC’s old ways—
remaining tight-lipped and highly protective of its own intelligence, which
serves merely as a resource for government policy makers. Former NSA
director Vice Admiral Bobby Inman described the NSA as “a loner or-
ganization” that “is often reluctant to share [classified materials] with
others lest a leak spoil their ability to get that kind of information
again.”219 Again, assuming the intelligence was collected legally, should
we then cover our eyes and enact institutional amnesia? If we agree some
sort of intelligence sharing should be permitted, the question left for de-
bate becomes who should be entitled to IC information and what should
be required of the potential user before access.
214. Indictment at 2–3, United States v. Jimenez-Naranjo, No. 05-235 (D.D.C. Sept. 25,
2007).
215. Superseding Indictment at 2, United States v. Mohammed, No. 06-357 (D.D.C.
Jan. 23, 2008), 2008 WL 5979391; Government’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 1–2,
United States v. Mohammed, No. 06-357 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2008), 2008 WL 5979405.
216. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 122, 21
U.S.C.A. § 960a (2013) (creating a new offense covering narco-terrorism).
217. Exec. Order No. 12,333, supra note 31, § 1.4 (emphasis added). “The heads of
elements of the Intelligence Community shall: ‘(g) Participate in the development of pro-
cedures approved by the Attorney General governing production and dissemination of
information or intelligence resulting from criminal drug intelligence activities abroad if
they have intelligence responsibilities for foreign or domestic criminal drug production and
trafficking . . . .’” Id. § 1.6. Procedures set forth in Part 1 of this Executive Order “shall
permit collection, retention, and dissemination of the following types of information: . . .
(c) Information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence, counterintelligence,
international drug or international terrorism investigation.” Id. § 2.3.
218. Id. § 2.6.
219. AID, supra note 69, at 163.
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2. Unlawful NSA Intercept
If the NSA intercept was collected and/or accessed illegally, then the
question becomes whether the initial illegality on the intelligence side
should prevent law enforcement from using that information on the do-
mestic, criminal investigation side. Should the initial illegality by the NSA
taint any subsequent evidence found as a result of the initial intelligence,
or does this fall under the independent source exception to the exclusion-
ary rule?
Despite the fact that agents entered a warehouse without a search war-
rant and discovered a bale of marijuana, the Court in Murray v. United
States found that the subsequent search with a warrant was lawful; the
subsequent search warrant was based upon probable cause and was com-
pletely separate and apart from the illegal initial search, and therefore,
the exclusionary rule did not apply.220 The Court did not appear con-
cerned that agents might get in the habit of conducting illegal searches
prior to obtaining a search warrant. Rather, the Court felt there was a
disincentive for police to initially conduct illegal searches prior to seeking
a search warrant.221 Justice Scalia wrote,
An officer with probable cause sufficient to obtain a search war-
rant would be foolish to enter the premises first in an unlawful man-
ner. By doing so, he would risk suppression of all evidence on the
premises, both seen and unseen, since his action would add to the
normal burden of convincing a magistrate that there is probable
cause, the much more onerous burden of convincing a trial court that
no information gained from the illegal entry affected either the law
enforcement officers’ decision to seek a warrant or the magistrate’s
decision to grant it. Nor would the officer without sufficient probable
cause to obtain a search warrant have any added incentive to con-
duct an unlawful entry, since whatever he finds cannot be used to
establish probable cause before a magistrate.222
Using the above argument in the context of this article, those con-
ducting the illegality would be the IC, and there would be repercussions
on the intelligence side as monitors/analysts would suffer possible crimi-
nal penalties for their hypothetical misdeeds, but the illegally obtained
information would be passed on to domestic law enforcement without its
knowledge as to the origins of that information. Those conducting a crim-
inal investigation would have no way of knowing how the information
was gathered, as they are separate and apart from the IC and the infor-
mation was presumably scrubbed and analyzed by the SOD before being
sent out to the field. The information received would not be used as prob-
able cause or as evidence in the criminal case, since probable cause would
be developed under the “consecutive construction” technique. Therefore,
the exclusionary rule would not apply even though the information in this
220. 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988).
221. Id.
222. Id.
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hypothetic example was obtained illegally. Even so, the best course of
action would be to discard or ignore IC-collected information in this in-
stance and thereby avoid any hint of impropriety. As it currently stands,
FISA warrants, E.O. 12,333, and section 702 interceptions are legal and
so if the NSA intercepts described in the Reuters article fall into one of
these three categories, such concern regarding illegalities are
unwarranted.
C. STEP 2: POTENTIAL DISCLOSURE OF NSA INTERCEPTS
Assuming we find the use of NSA intercepts (lawful or unlawful but
permissible) to be an acceptable tool to initiate criminal investigations,
should the NSA intercepts be disclosed to the defense?
We must first assume that the NSA intercept will not be used as evi-
dence at trial. According to the Reuters article, the IC information is be-
ing used to initiate criminal investigations and is not used as a
substitution for substantive evidence that can be used at trial.223 There-
fore, this is an entirely different scenario than those joint FBI cases in
which information collected initially for foreign intelligence is then woven
into a domestic terrorism case through the use of CIPA section 6. Section
6 allows the prosecution and defense to request that classified material be
used at trial and rather than revealing the true source or identity of the
information, either side is permitted to submit a “substitution” that the
judge deems adequate.224 At trial, the evidence is automatically entered
into evidence without establishing the typical evidentiary foundations,
and the jury is not aware of the actual source in order to protect the IC’s
sources and methods.225
Rather, the case here involves CIPA section 4 and a prosecutor’s dis-
covery obligations. If the material is discoverable, then the original IC
material should be disclosed to the defense. However, under CIPA sec-
tion 4226 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1),227 the prose-
cution may file an ex parte motion to have the original classified material
protected from disclosure or if discoverable, “substituted” and revealed
in another form to protect the IC’s sources and methods. This process is
very similar to the prosecution’s request for a protective order and denial
223. Shiffman & Cooke, supra note 2.
224. CIPA, supra note 146, § 6.
225. Id.
226. “The court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the United States to delete
specified items of classified information from documents to be made available to the de-
fendant through discovery under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . . The court
may permit the United States to make a request for such authorization to be inspected by
the court alone.”  CIPA, supra note 146, § 4.
227. “At any time the court may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or
inspection, or grant other appropriate relief. The court may permit a party to show good
cause by a written statement that the court will inspect ex parte. If relief is granted, the
court must preserve the entire text of the party’s statement under seal.” FED. R. CRIM. P.
16(d)(1).
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of defendant’s request to disclose an informant’s identity. In fact, this
analogy was made in United States v. Yunis:
We hold, in short, that classified information is not discoverable on a
mere showing of theoretical relevance in the face of the govern-
ment’s classified information privilege, but that the threshold for dis-
covery in this context further requires that a defendant seeking
classified information, like a defendant seeking the informant’s iden-
tity in Roviaro, is entitled only to information that is at least helpful
to the defense of the accused.228
The only appellate case that seems to have addressed this exact topic is
United States v. Mejia, in which following a jury trial, defendant Rafael
Mejia was convicted of “conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms of
cocaine with the knowledge and intent that such cocaine would be unlaw-
fully imported into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a),
960(a)(3), 960(b)(1)(B)(ii) and 963.”229 “The investigation involved mul-
tiple wiretaps, which captured Colombian nationals Mejia and Rios dis-
cussing large drug transactions with other members of their drug
trafficking organization.”230 In Mejia, the court issued an order notifying
the parties that ex parte filings had taken place and asked counsel for
both sides (who had been unaware of the previous filings) to file briefs
“addressing ‘whether, to what extent, and under what circumstances
CIPA § 4 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(d)(1) authorize the
non-disclosure of information otherwise arguably subject to discovery
under Rule 16.’”231 While the defendants argued that they should be en-
titled to view the classified material in order to make an intelligent argu-
ment before the court, the court pointed out that CIPA section 4 governs
only the discovery of classified information.232 CIPA section 4 permits the
judge to make such a decision ex parte.233 The court referred to the
House Report on CIPA, which stated, “‘[s]ince the government is seeking
to withhold classified information from the defendant, an adversary hear-
ing with defense knowledge would defeat the very purpose of the discov-
ery rules.’”234
Upset that neither side had been aware of such classified material ex-
isting prior to the appeal, the appellate court reminded the defendants
that the district court had, in fact, reviewed the material prior to trial, and
coupled with the Circuit court’s de novo review, this “made up for any
defici[ency] in that regard.”235 And, “[m]ore fundamentally, because the
underlying classified material is unhelpful to the defendants, they did not
suffer from its unavailability; and because that material was never shown
228. 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
229. 448 F.3d 436, 439 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
230. Id. at 438.
231. Id. at 454.
232. Id. at 454, 457.
233. Id. at 457.
234. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-831, pt. 1, at 27 n.22 (1980)).
235. Id. at 459.
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to the jury, ‘there is no question here of convictions based upon secret
evidence furnished to the fact-finder but withheld from the
defendants.’”236
Upon evaluating the classified material in order to determine whether
a protective order was necessary or whether the material was, in fact,
discoverable, the court agreed that the appropriate test was the Roviaro
informant’s privilege test. The court evaluated the discoverability of the
material using a three part test: (1) did the information “cross the low
hurdle of relevance?” (2) was “the assertion of privilege by the govern-
ment . . . at least a colorable one?” and (3) was the information at least
“helpful to the defense of the accused” as defined in Roviaro?237 The
court found that while the material was relevant and that the government
had a privilege, the classified material fell short of the “‘helpful or benefi-
cial character’ necessary to meet the threshold showing for overcoming
the privilege.”238
If the IC information is not exculpatory, not helpful to the defense in
preparation for trial, and will not be used as evidence at trial, there is no
reason why the prosecution must disclose the information (in original
form or otherwise). For example, if the NSA intercepts a conversation
between a Colombian trafficker (the NSA target) in Colombia and a do-
mestic distributor (the target of a subsequent criminal investigation), and
the distributor makes inculpatory statements, there need be no disclo-
sure. Under CIPA § 4, the prosecution could request a protective order to
prevent such disclosure since the information does not fall under Brady
or Giglio, nor is it “helpful to the defense” as defined in Roviaro. While
Rule 16(a) requires disclosure of all recordings/statements of the defen-
dant, the statements were made prior to the criminal investigation and
will not be used as part of the evidence at trial.
However, in a second scenario, assume the Colombian trafficker told
the distributor, “If you don’t distribute my drugs, I will kill your family.”
This is evidence of illegal activity and, despite signs of clear duress, this
information is passed on to law enforcement and they choose to prose-
cute the distributor when they learn he is head of a large drug distribution
ring. (This would seem extremely unlikely.) That statement must be dis-
closed in some form. CIPA § 4 requires disclosure and permits the disclo-
sure in substituted form as the defense may want to use this duress
evidence at trial.239
Lastly, in a third scenario, assume the Colombian trafficker contacts an
alleged distributor, and as he speaks about the drug trafficking operation
with this distributor, the distributor says, “I have no idea what you are
talking about. You have the wrong number.” This, of course, would be
exculpatory and should be disclosed; however, this type of information is
236. Id. (quoting United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 488 (1st Cir. 1993)).
237. Id. at 455–56 (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60–61).
238. Id. at 456.
239. CIPA, supra note 146, § 4.
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also unlikely to be passed to law enforcement in the first place due to its
exculpatory nature. There is no domestic target to be investigated.
Defense attorneys have argued under scenario one that they need this
type of protected information to ensure there is no entrapment, or that
this protected information may have resulted in a mistake or bias. But
this argument is difficult to justify. The defense is much more likely to
encounter entrapment, mistake, or bias in a situation where information
from an informant or spouse, family member, or a friend’s tip to law en-
forcement initiated the investigation. A wire intercept, email, or even
“metadata” collected by the NSA is much less “biased” than an inform-
ant who has a motive to lie/stretch the truth when it suits his or her needs.
The question to be asked is why does defense counsel really need this
inculpatory yet non-evidentiary information? It could be curiosity, which
is one of the reasons why many defendants want to know an informant’s
identity. Another reason could be because introducing an NSA intercept
into the proceedings could muddy the waters at trial and cause the jury to
focus on public outrage at the NSA’s power, potential abuse, and their
fears that the government has become a surveillance state.240 Or, the de-
fense does not trust that the government will turn the information over to
the court for review and that the judge will be able to make a neutral
decision on the issue without the defense’s perspective. After all, the only
party fully aware of what might be “helpful” to the defense is the defen-
dant himself.
The lack of adversarial testing is always listed as the greatest concern
regarding CIPA section 4 decisions during which defense counsel is
neither provided notice nor asked for input. This concern was raised in
the 5-4 Supreme Court decision, Clapper v. Amnesty International.241
In Clapper, the plaintiffs challenging the 702 program were unable to
prove they had standing because the government never disclosed whether
in fact the defendants had ever been intercepted under 702. The FAA
(section 702) allows the use of evidence derived from FISA surveillance
in criminal prosecutions.242 However under FISA, the government must
provide notice of its intent to use evidence obtained and derived from
electronic surveillance pursuant to FISA orders.243 The Solicitor General
Donald B. Verrilli Jr. assured the Court that if the plaintiffs had been
surveilled, the government would, in fact, provide notice if the govern-
ment intended to “use or disclose information obtained or derived from”
FISA or 702 surveillance so that “the affected person may challenge the
240. Challenging an NSA intercept’s legality makes sense in a case in which the evi-
dence derived from the intercept will be used against the defendant at trial, but it makes
little sense when the information from the intercept will not be used and was not a part of
the criminal investigation.
241. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
242. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1806(a), 1825(a).
243. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 122.
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lawfulness of the acquisition.”244 The Court accepted Verrilli’s assurances
as true and found the plaintiffs had no standing to challenge the 702 sur-
veillance program since they could not prove they had been
intercepted.245
Since Clapper, Verrilli learned that in some cases, the government had
not provided notice to defendants.246 The National Security Division has
since changed its practice and has begun to provide full notice to defend-
ants in cases where evidence used at trial derived from FISA or 702
programs.247
In the case of parallel construction, the evidence obtained or derived
from the FISA or 702 surveillance is not intended to be used in judicial or
administrative proceedings. It is merely being used to initiate a criminal
investigation at which time law enforcement is developing separate evi-
dence apart from the IC surveillance. Therefore, there is a significant dif-
ference between CIPA section 6 in which the government intends IC
evidence to be used at trial where opposing counsel’s input is required,
and CIPA section 4 where the government does not intend to use IC evi-
dence, nor is the evidence used at trial derived from IC evidence, because
law enforcement initiated their own criminal investigation separate and
apart from the original IC evidence. Classified material is not to be used
as facts to support a search warrant or arrest, and therefore, evidence
used at trial is not “derived from” FISA or 702 surveillance.
In this instance, defense counsel’s input is not as critical, since the
judge is merely making a determination as to whether the IC information
is discoverable. Judges make these determinations frequently under Rule
16, which allows judges to make discovery decisions ex parte while also
preserving the entire text for appellate purposes.248
However, the government must justify its reasons for requesting an ex
parte decision. Why does the government want to protect this type of
intelligence and are its concerns justified? Does the IC want to protect its
sources and methods, or does the IC merely want to prevent legitimate
scrutiny of certain NSA programs? If defense counsel and defendants
were given the ability to access these intercepts, underlying FISA war-
rants, and details as to what, when, how, and when calls are intercepted
and information collected, the IC would face more questions, more scru-
tiny and uncertainty, causing the IC to further justify both legally and
244. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4:12-17, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct.
1138 (2013) (No. 11-1025); see also Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138 at 1154.
245. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1154–55.
246. Adam Liptak, A Secret Surveillance Program Proves Challengeable in Theory
Only, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2013, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/us/
double-secret-surveillance.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
247. Devline Barrett, U.S. Spy Program Lifts Veil in Court, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2013,
http://on.wsj.com/19nu8KC; Charlie Savage, Federal Prosecutors, in a Policy Shift, Cite
Warrantless Wiretaps as Evidence, N.Y. TIMES, October 27, 2013, at A21, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/us/federal-prosecutors-in-a-policy-shift-cite-warrantless-
wiretaps-as-evidence.html.
248. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1).
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morally their classified programs in the aftermath of the Snowden disclo-
sures. The protection of sources and methods is the only legitimate justifi-
cation for the government’s request to withhold this type of information
from defense counsel, and the basis for the judge’s order of non-
disclosure.
V. CONCLUSION
As it currently stands, there is nothing prohibiting the DEA from
utilizing NSA intercepts under FISA or 702 or E.O. 12,333 as tips to initi-
ate criminal investigations. If the NSA information was legally obtained
and mandated by statute, then presumably, the NSA may share this intel-
ligence with DEA.249 However, if this information came from a program
deemed illegal by the FISC or unsanctioned by Congress, then the tip
should not be passed on to the DEA.
The larger question is whether we find unfettered intelligence sharing
acceptable in the first place. National security is the government’s num-
ber one priority. In cases where the IC collects positive intelligence of a
criminal nature, doesn’t it make sense to share? Sharing of resources and
intelligence among local, state and federal law enforcement agencies has
always been deemed to be efficient and cost effective, and necessary. The
same applies for intelligence agencies and their assistance to the domestic
law enforcement community. Many criminal organizations commit crimes
that are investigated by multiple agencies—would it make sense to have
an artificial wall between different agencies that would prevent them
from sharing amongst themselves the information they individually de-
velop while investigating the same target? As the rationale for the PA-
TRIOT ACT pointed out, counterterrorism investigations and criminal
law enforcement investigations are not mutually exclusive.
Some claim that intelligence sharing provides law enforcement with an
“end-run” around Fourth Amendment protections. The courts are sensi-
tive to these considerations, but Congress has authorized IC collection
programs. In addition, the use of foreign wiretap information has been
accepted as evidence in U.S. criminal proceedings despite the fact that
foreign countries may or may not have the same probable cause/Fourth
Amendment standards the United States requires, and yet this evidence
is admissible and non-controversial.
The net effect of this controversy may well be that the IC will be reluc-
tant to pass any information to law enforcement, or perhaps domestic law
enforcement will be reticent to use this information to initiate criminal
investigations due to an overabundance of concern that the classified tip
will be repeatedly challenged during trial proceedings.
249. “Because warrantless eavesdropping on Americans is illegal, tips from intelligence
agencies are generally not forwarded to the SOD until a caller’s citizenship can be veri-
fied.” Shiffman & Cooke, supra note 2.
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With the shroud of secrecy covering NSA surveillance activity comes
understandable confusion and subsequent over dramatization of reality.
In the previously mentioned “The Good Wife” episodes, the line between
fact and fiction about what the NSA can and cannot do is blurred. Let us
examine and separate what is real and legal from what is fiction and ille-
gal, which should put into perspective NSA’s operational parameters.
The NSA obtains a FISA warrant against Arab-American translator
Danny Marwat based upon a photo that shows military contractor
Marwat in Afghanistan speaking to a known Taliban member.250 Marwat
claims he gave him food and medication because the Taliban member’s
daughter was suffering from dysentery.251 The show claims this photo was
not only sufficient probable cause to prove Marwat was a foreign agent
for FISA purposes but also sufficient for the U.S. government to subse-
quently kidnap and torture him to elicit a confession that he was collabo-
rating with the Taliban.252 Based upon FISA’s rigorous probable cause
requirements and its known “cumbersome” process leading up to FISC
review and approval, it is highly unlikely the NSA would obtain a FISA
warrant on Marwat. Moreover, even under section 207 of the PATRIOT
Act, a FISA wiretap can only last for 120 days (not two years as men-
tioned in “The Good Wife”) and a one-year extension may be available if
the government can demonstrate sufficient probable cause to stay up.253
It is also highly unlikely the NSA would be listening to calls between
Marwat and Florrick if they were not discussing matters related to foreign
intelligence and national security as FISA requires that monitors follow
minimization procedures, which would restrict monitoring calls that were
not relevant to obtaining foreign intelligence.
The episode also mentioned that the FISA warrant on Marwat was a
“two hop” warrant which not only allowed monitoring of Marwat, his
lawyers, and his lawyers’ contacts but later obtained a “three hop” war-
rant once Florrick’s son received multiple “vague” calls from his ex-girl-
friend because the phone number was associated with a Somali national
and potential Hamas sympathizer.254 Again, a personal call of this nature
would be minimized and insufficient to establish probable cause for a
FISA warrant, and more importantly, there is no such thing as a two hop
or three hop FISA warrant. Two or three hop refers to the NSA’s ability
to access telephony metadata not content once a target phone number or
email has been identified. No such thing exists under FISA. The show
never suggests the NSA obtained a separate FISA warrant on Florrick or
her co-workers or family members, and therefore, these NSA intercep-
tions are illegal. (Nor does section 702 apply since only a foreign person
outside the United States can be targeted, and Marwat is a U.S. citizen.)
250. The Good Wife: The Bit Bucket, supra note 4.
251. The Good Wife: Executive Order 13224, supra note 4.
252. Id.
253. PATRIOT Act, supra note 42, sec. 207.
254. The Good Wife: The Bit Bucket, supra note 4.
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Putting aside the illegality of the surveillance, the TV show leaves us
with the perception that NSA monitors have the ability to simply pick up
the phone and meet with law enforcement agents on a regular basis in
order to pass on anything that might be useful to police.255 While the
NSA may disclose evidence of a crime to the DEA, in this episode, the
DEA agent informed no one of his original source and in fact, had a
witness cover it up. This is not an example of “parallel construction.” The
agent did not receive a tip and develop his own probable cause to arrest
Bishop – the agent solely relied upon the NSA intercept to develop prob-
able cause to arrest.256 Under CIPA, a government attorney would have
had to make the judge aware of the classified material prior to the hear-
ing and if it was necessary to use the information as evidence, request a
substitution under section 6. The defense would have been aware of the
substitution that more likely than not would have been in the form of a
statement or agent testimony (e.g., perhaps indicate that a confidential
informant reported the impending narcotics transaction rather than re-
veal the actual intercept). In reality, a series of checks and balances have
been put into place by requiring this type of information to go through an
agent, government attorney, and judge before determining the discovera-
bility of the particular classified material in each criminal case.
For clarification, the NSA intercept would not be used as evidence at
trial because the police should have developed their own probable cause
during their investigation and the NSA intercept would have been dis-
cussed under CIPA section 4 as an ex parte discovery matter between the
judge and prosecutor. If the NSA intercept contained information that
was exculpatory, a substitution would be created to protect the FISA
warrant, and the defense would be given the evidence in discovery, and a
protective order for the classified material would be issued. A witness
would not perjure himself in open court, and the DEA would not have
kept all parties in the dark as to the original source of the information.
FISA has been around since 1978; CIPA since 1980. They are effective
tools that provide a certain level of fairness to the defendant and govern-
ment by balancing the government’s need to protect its sources and meth-
ods and the defendant’s need for discovery and right to a fair trial.
This fictional television show addresses unreal but imagined NSA
abuses that are farcical in the real world, albeit plausible in the realm of
American imagination. Unfortunately, our imagination does run wild
when information about secret government programs is leaked and media
and entertainment sources mislead the general public. In reality, as op-
posed to “The Good Wife,” the three Colombian drug trafficking scena-
rios discussed in this article seem much more likely: a foreign narcotics
trafficker with narco-terrorism ties is targeted by the NSA and makes
contact with a domestic distributor/supplier, and the NSA chooses to pass
that information along to domestic law enforcement.
255. The Good Wife: Parallel Construction, Bitches, supra note 8.
256. Id.
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Our greatest concern lies in the fact that we distrust the government. In
light of the Snowden disclosures, Americans have found these NSA pro-
grams to be distasteful and a violation of our privacy. However, as dis-
cussed, domestic-to-domestic communications are not being monitored
unless approved through the FISA process and foreign-to-domestic com-
munications must be minimized to prevent inadvertent interception of
U.S. persons unless one of the listed exceptions applies in the case of
section 702.
Defense attorneys and the public, in general, have grave doubts that
the government will fulfill its discovery and CIPA obligations and turn
over classified material that is exculpatory or “helpful to one’s defense.”
At least with a confidential informant, the defendant has a greater chance
of learning about the presence of an informant than if it were IC informa-
tion—there are usually audio and/or video recordings of their encounters
or agent reports or affidavits refer to a confidential informant. With an
NSA intercept, the defendant (and possibly the local prosecutor) will
have no idea how the case was initiated, and therefore, must trust that the
government will disclose that information to the judge under CIPA § 4.
Thus, an ongoing discussion as to whether sufficient oversight and adver-
sarial testing exists to protect a defendant’s constitutional rights is critical.
Permitting a defense attorney with an adequate security clearance to at-
tend and participate in the CIPA section 4 discovery hearing during which
it is determined whether the classified material is, in fact, “discoverable”
might solve many of the issues raised by the defense bar.
In determining whether the overall practice of intelligence sharing
should be acceptable, the question is, what do we expect as citizens and
taxpayers from our law enforcement agencies? Should law enforcement
merely respond to crimes after they are committed, or should law en-
forcement be proactive and implement programs to prevent crime before
it occurs? The answer is fairly obvious. If we want law enforcement to
protect and defend us from harm, be proactive and take the fight to the
criminal element within our society, then we need to provide them with
the necessary tools to do just that.
The practice of sharing IC intelligence with law enforcement is not ille-
gal. The procedure by which intelligence is transmitted to the field and
protected from the defendant under CIPA § 4 is not flawed and seems to
work as designed. What these recent disclosures by Snowden and the me-
dia have brought to the forefront is our natural suspicions that the gov-
ernment is abusing its power and hiding information from us, and our
natural curiosity feeds our paranoia. We want to know what we do not
know. And we do not trust our government to disclose classified informa-
tion when it is the right thing to do, and there is a moral and legal impera-
tive to do so.
